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We estimate a dynamic intertemporal model with non-clearing markets that mimics features of European 
labour markets, such as sticky nominal wages and sluggish adjustment of employment to shocks for 15 
OECD countries. The estimates include a measure for the degree of labour market sluggishness that 
compares well with standard indicators of product and labour market regulation. Calibration of the model 
on a selected country sample confirms its explanatory power in comparison with the standard competitive 
markets model. In a second step, the measure for labour market sluggishness is used as a policy variable 
and model variants are simulated in order to assess the extent to which the countries would have performed 
better with more flexible labour markets. These policy experiments show that an increase in labour market 
flexibility reduces the volatility of consumption relative to production, improves intertemporal efficiency 
but entails higher employment risk for households. 
 
 
JEL Codes: E32, C61 
 
Keywords:  nominal and real rigidities, non-clearing labour markets, business cycles, labour market 
reforms in OECD countries 
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Non-technical summary 
Structural reforms have been stressed recurrently by international organisations and central banks such as 
the OECD, the IMF and the ECB as being of particular importance for the euro area. In particular, 
important positive effects on productivity, output and employment growth have been seen as resulting 
from more flexible labour and product markets that would free up resources, strengthen incentives for 
innovative and productive activities and allow for a more rapid adjustment to structural shocks. However, 
while the long-run consequences of structural reforms have received increasing attention in the literature, 
including a discussion regarding political economy problems related to an optimal implementation of 
reforms, the influences of structural reforms on short-term dynamics have only recently gained more 
prominence in economic analysis, mainly through the development of models around the New Keynesian 
type. However, while these models have been very popular in assessing the impact of monetary (and 
fiscal) policy in an environment with market imperfections, the correlation and dynamic links that exist 
between the main macroeconomic aggregates, their interaction with structural rigidities on labour and 
product markets and the consequences this may have for economic efficiency have not (yet) been widely 
studied. 
In order to address the impact of structural reforms on the short-term macroeconomic performance in a 
coherent way, we present an intertemporal model with capital accumulation and non-clearing labour and 
product markets that can account for both nominal and real rigidities. Introducing disequilibrium and 
nonclearing markets is meant to yield a first approximation to modelling the adjustment problems that the 
European countries face with their persistent high level of (structural) unemployment, concentrating, 
however, on the short-run dynamics. By using the disequilibrium approach to labour market frictions, we 
take an agnostic stance regarding the origin of the underlying nominal or real rigidities. The model’s 
parameters are estimated for 15 different OECD countries. Besides parameters for preferences and 
technology, the degree of labour market disequilibrium can be numerically assessed and compared with 
standard institutional indicators regarding structural rigidities on labour and product markets. With these 
parameter estimates at hand, we first calibrate the model for a selected sample of OECD economies in 
order to assess its fit in comparison with the Real Business Cycle model of the competitive type. We show 
that our macroeconomic non-clearing labour market model allows better than the standard RBC model to 
reflect the existence of labour market institutions and the institutional variation of labour markets across 
OECD countries. Moreover, introducing nominal and real frictions and non-clearing markets appear to 
describe the labour market dynamics better than the standard RBC model. In particular, the disequilibrium 
model allows better to account for well-known problems of the standard RBC model such as the excessive 
smoothness of employment in comparison with empirical data. 6
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In a second step, we run various alternative simulations with changes in the degree of labour market 
disequilibrium in order to evaluate the impact a more flexible labour market may have on the dynamic 
properties of the model. In particular, we look at the volatility of consumption relative to production and 
employment, as an indirect measure of intertemporal efficiency. In our policy simulations, we show that, 
while reducing employment protection legislation and hence labour adjustment costs for firms, households 
are able to improve risk sharing over the cycle and decrease consumption volatility, yet they face higher 
employment risk. Increasing labour market flexibility thereby improves the efficiency characteristics of 
these simulated economies by resulting in a greater intertemporal consumption smoothing but it also 
entails a higher employment risk faced by households. 
Overall, the paper presents comparative and consistent evidence on the impact of nominal and real 
stickiness as well as the structural reforms on the dynamic properties of OECD economies. The model 
shows some potential to evaluate structural reforms by explicitly estimating frictions on labour and 
product markets. By carrying out simulations we are able to assess the short-run dynamic properties 
resulting from these frictions. Reducing them affects both intertemporal efficiency and households’ 
employment risk. An important issue in this context is the problem to what extent households have 
sufficient access to financial markets, if -- through reforms -- the labour market is made more flexible.  To 
our knowledge, however, this aspect of structural reforms has not sufficiently been addressed in the 
literature. 1.  Introduction
1 
 
Structural reforms have been stressed recurrently by the ECB as being of particular importance for the euro 
area. In particular, important positive effects on productivity, output and employment growth have been 
seen as resulting from more flexible labour and product markets that would free up resources, strengthen 
incentives for innovative and productive activities and allow for a more rapid adjustment to structural 
shocks. Some if not all of these effects have been the object of a rapidly increasing literature regarding the 
long-term impact of structural reforms (for important recent studies see Bayouni, Laxton and Pesenti 
(2004); OECD (2003); Derose, Langedijk and Roeger (2004) and Roeger (2004)). In this paper we will 
particularly focus on nominal and real rigidities of the labour market and the effect of labour market 
reforms on the macroeconomic performance of the countries.  
As concerning the labour market, it is usually presumed that nominal rigidities constrain the scope and 
speed of real variables to adjust to aggregate supply or demand shocks.  These nominal rigidities are to 
induce changes in the reaction of nominal prices and wages. Consequently, the adjustment of output and 
employment may depend on whether nominal rigidities are high (strong pressure on output to adjust) or 
low (low output adjustment). As compared to nominal rigidities, real rigidities are thought to prevent the 
economy to move more rapidly to some steady state. Hence, the flexible economy is believed to move 
in a faster way to some equilibrium by adjusting prices and output more speedily.  
A related but somehow different question regards the co-variation and dynamic links that exist between the 
main macroeconomic aggregates for economies with less or more flexibility. In order to address the impact 
of structural reforms on the macroeconomic performance in a coherent way, an intertemporal model with 
non-clearing markets will be used that can account for nominal and real rigidities. Our model with frictions 
on the labour market is meant to yield a first approximation to modelling the adjustment problems that the 
European countries face with their persistent high level of (structural) unemployment, concentrating, 
however, on the short and medium run dynamics. We employ here a model that has been proposed in Gang 
and Semmler (2006, ch. 8; 2003).
2 The model can be estimated and simulated for different countries and 
the effect of various policy parameters on the short-and medium run dynamics can be considered.  
In order to assess the importance of structural rigidities such as those discussed above and their importance 
for European economies, we will make use of an intertemporal decision model with price rigidities and 
disequilibrium on the labour market. The main deviation from the standard perfect competition, market 
                                                       
1   This work has benefited from extensive and helpful interactions with M. Lenza (EMO) as well as from comments made during 
an ECB-internal presentation. 
2   Our model has strong similarities with a recent model by Uhlig (2004). There, however, exogenous wages are presumed, while 
for our paper a sequence of (sticky) wages has been taken from the data. 
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the equilibrium path. For the product market, this in turn opens the possibility for real aggregate demand to 
affect actual production, the return on investment and hence the evolution of the capital stock. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of our dynamic non-
clearing market model, estimates it for selected OECD countries and explores the role of nominal and real 
stickiness. Section 3 studies the possible impacts of structural reforms in the context of such a model by 
undertaking simulations. Section 4 concludes the paper. 
2.  Model set up and estimations 
In the following, we will describe the main structure of the model. Thereafter, we will describe the 
methods that have been applied to estimate the structural parameters of the model. In a second section, we 
will more closely describe our measure of the degree of labour market disequilibrium across countries. 
Finally, we will match this measure with indicators that have been established earlier to distinguish clearly 
between real and nominal rigidities in our model. 
2.1  The Disequilibrium model
3 
The underlying macroeconomic model follows closely established standards in the literature. In particular, 
it is based on an intertemporal decision model with a representative household that determines its 
consumption and leisure pattern with respect to a budget constraint and an accumulated capital stock. The 
economy is subject to a continuous stream of technology shocks, which are supposed to be the only source 
other one the case where labour market transactions can take place off the equilibrium path. Finally, as 
The timing of the decision problem is shown in figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: The timing of market exchanges 
Firms and households










                                                       
3   This section builds on the paper by Gong and Semmler (2003) and Gang and Semmler (2006, Ch. 8). A similar model can be 
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of shocks. Two model variants will be analysed, one being the standard model of market clearing, and the  
money is not included in this model, prices will be absent and wages representing real wage developments. 2.1.1  The model structure 
To take a short cut, we can presume, as the equilibrium model does, that the economy is characterised by a 
representative household and a representative firm. Agents enter market exchanges in three markets: the 
product, the labour and the capital market. The household owns all factors of production and sells factor 
services to the firm and buys its products for consumption or accumulation of the capital stock. The 
product market is assumed to be imperfectly competitive, with the firm facing a perceived demand curve 
and a sticky price (fixed at p=1). 
Unlike the standard RBC model with competitive markets, the market in this model will be re-opened at 
the beginning of each period t, necessary to ensure adjustment in response to a non-clearing labour market. 
The non-clearing of the market is caused by wage stickiness as the sequence of wages {}
∞
=0 t t w  is 
contracted and preset at t=0 and will not be allowed to change even if the market does not clear. The 
decision process, therefore, has two stages: in a first step, households determine their consumption and 
labour supply pattern, in a second step, they re-optimise their consumption plans following the realised 
transactions on the factor market. 
At period t=0, the representative household expects a series of technology shocks {}
∞
= + 0 i i t t A E and real 
wages and interest rates {}
∞
= + + 0 , i i t t i t t r E w E . The decision problem of the household is then to choose a 
sequence of planned consumption and labour effort { }
∞
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where superscripts d and s stand for “demand” and “supply”, β designates the intertemporal preference 
rate, δ the depreciation rate, π firms’ profits and γ stands for the stationarity parameter. Using standard 
dynamic programming techniques, this optimal planning problem can be solved to yield the solution 
sequence{}
∞








t n c ,  is actually carried out. 




t n k ,  given expected demand for its products Eyt 
related to its perceived demand curve. Standard (one-period) profit maximization yields the factor demand 
functions: 
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       (A1.2) 
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t t k k k = =  . On the labour market, however, the fixed wage contract 
does usually not allow to clear the market
4. 
In order to assess the impact of structural rigidities on labour markets, we introduce nominal wage rigidity 
in the first period, such that actual employment does no longer correspond to labour supply for that period. 
In order to determine actual transactions on the labour market, a transaction rule has to be defined. In the 
standard disequilibrium literature on which the approach of this note is built, the short side of the market is 





t t n n n , min = .      
However, such an assumption may be too restrictive, as employment may need time to adjust from one 
period to the other. Here, instead, we want to modify this rule to allow labour transactions off the labour 
demand schedule. This may happen, for instance, when employment is negotiated or when firms hoard 
labour in downturns, employing more than the profit-maximising level of workers. The rule that we want 





t t n n n ω ω − + = 1 ,                                                     (A1.3) 
where ω measures the degree to which employment is determined by labour demand and will play a key 
role in the interpretation of the model and its results.  
Once the factor inputs have been determined, the firm proceeds with deciding its output level. Note that the 
firm is constrained not only by a potential disequilibrium on the labour market but also by the prospects of 
product market demand (recall that prices are fixed), Eyt. Hence the firm will select the optimal capital 
stock











n k A f y t s










where  t y ˆ  is the realisation of Eyt in period t, yielding the output supply function  () t t t
s
t A n k f y , , = .  
Once output supply has been determined, the representative household needs to re-optimise given the 
difference between actual and planned employment levels. Given the realised factor transactions () t t n k ,  
                                                       
4   This may nevertheless happen if either the representative firm has perfect foresight on the sequence of technology shocks or 
the wage contract is done in the form of a contingency plan. Both will be excluded here; see Gong and Semmler (2003) on a 
discussion on this latter point. In an extension of our model we presume that the wage is partially adjusted to some optimal 
wage, ω*, but it is still very sticky, see Gong and Semmler (2005). There we also get a non-clearing labour market. 
5   Notice that capital markets clear instantaneously and capital can be adjusted at no cost following an unfavourable realisation of 
the demand shock. 
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as: 
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which can be used to derive the consumption demand based on realised transactions in the factor markets 
and the realisation of the technology shock in period t. 
2.1.2  Some specifications 
In order to implement the model empirically (see the summary in the following box), certain specifications 
regarding the preference function, the technology shock and the stationarity of the time series have to be 
made. 
The economy is represented by a consumer characterised by an instantaneous utility function over 
consumption, c, and leisure, l=1-n: 
() ( ) ( ) n c n c U − + = 1 ln ln , θ  
with  θ the elasticity between consumption and leisure to be estimated with the data. Moreover, 
technological shocks are supposed to follow and AR(1) process: 
t t t A a a A ε + + = + 1 0 1  where  ( )
2 , 0 ~ ε σ ε N t  
The stationarity parameter, γ, can be retrieved by calculating the trend growth rate of output. Finally, 
employment, nt, is based on (normalised) hours worked (sample mean N ), considering that only 1/3 of a 
day is dedicated to work on average. 
 
Box: The data generation process and model estimation 
The estimation of the model is based on the data generation process that can be summarised as follows 
•  The evolution of the – stationnarised – capital stock 
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t t t A a a A ε + + = + 1 0 1  
•  The production function 
( )
α α 3 . 0
1 N n k A y t t t t
− =  
•  Labour supply 
1 12 11 g k G A G n t t
s + + =  
•  Labour demand 
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t t n n n ω ω − + = 1  
•  Consumption decision 
2 23 22 21 g n G k G A G c t t t t + + + =  
•  Expected production 
1 − = t t y Ey  
The model is estimated by minimising the weighted distance between observed and simulated values of k, 
c and n where the weighting matrix suggested by Newey and West (1987) has been used. 
2.2  Estimation of structural parameters 
In order to estimate the model described in the previous section, several parameters have to be determined. 
These include: (i) the parameters describing the process of technological progress; (ii) the preference 
parameters and the depreciation rate of the capital stock and (iii) the labour market disequilibrium 
parameter. 
While the first parameters can be estimated easily be estimating an AR(1) process using the TFP residuals 
that can be derived from a standard growth accounting exercise, the preference parameters are deeply 
linked to the first-order conditions that result from solving the above dynamic programming problem. This 
fact can be used to apply GMM techniques in order to estimate these parameters
6. Concretely, the 
                                                       
6   Instead of estimating the unknown parameters of a specific model, generalised method of moments (GMM) techniques require 
only a set of moments which the model should satisfy. GMM techniques are particularly useful if only consistent but not 
necessarily efficient parameter estimates are required and have been widely used in the estimation of dynamic general 
equilibrium models (see Mátyás, 1999, for a good introduction into these techniques). 
12
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of the above model to those of the underlying data; this is achieved through a minimum distance estimator 
between the observed data and those produced by the data generation process (see the box above). Notice, 
moreover, that these parameters can be established without a concrete knowledge of the underlying labour 
market disequilibrium as they are supposed to be fundamental to preferences and technology and hence 
unrelated to rigidities on the labour market
7. 
Given the highly non-linear nature of the optimisation problem, the algorithm used to pick the right 
parameters β, δ and θ had to ensure that any local optimum of the GMM technique is to be avoided. Here, a 
technique called “simulated annealing” has been applied that uses Monte Carlo techniques to search for a 
global optimum.
8 The resulting parameters for our 15 countries can be found in the following table. Note 
that the wage share, α, has not been estimated but taken from country tables, averaging the values over the 
corresponding periods for these countries
9. As can be seen from the table, the parameters β, δ, θ and α for 
each of those countries fall into the vicinity of parameters that have been utilized in calibration exercises of 
RBC models or have been estimated for certain country specific data sets.
10 
While the time preference rates are relatively close across countries, corresponding to the standard interval 
for these models between 0.95 and 0.99, the country sample displays a large range of values for the capital 
depreciation rates, probably reflecting some country specific trends
11. In particular the value for Finland 
seems to be excessively large, implying an annual depreciation rate of 36%; this may be related to the 
particular events surrounding the deep economic crisis in 1993. The other two parameters seem to fall into 
a reasonable range. Yet, it must be mentioned that no commonly accepted estimates exist regarding the 
substitution elasticity between consumption and leisure. In calibration studies it is usually assumed that a 
reasonable range of the elasticity of substitution parameter is 0.5<θ<4; our estimates for this parameter fall 
into the range 1.5<θ<4, and are thus quite reasonable. 
 
                                                       
7    Using the same fundamental parameters for both the competitive RBC model and the disequilibrium model puts further 
restrictions on the latter: Assessing the fit of the disequilibrium model and its improvement over the RBC is hence related 
exclusively to the introduction of the disequilibrium process itself, which is what we want to concentrate on in this paper. 
8   Details of this algorithm are described in Gong and Semmler (1997) and Judd (1998, ch. 8.3, pp. 299-301). In the absence of a 
closed-form solution for the standard errors of the parameters, no standard errors have been reported as we are primarily 
interested by consistent estimates, not necessarily efficient ones (similar to the majority of papers in this vein). The 
representative agent framework being only a very rough approximation to reality, the standard errors of these parameters have 
to be expected to be large as neither agent heterogeneity nor capital vintages are taken into account. We take, however, comfort 
in the fact that our estimates of the country-specific deep parameters are close to those reported in the literature. 
9   See section 5.1 for the different country-specific time periods. 
10   Estimations for different US data sets are reported in Gong and Semmler (2006, Ch. 5). There an also be found a detailed 




Working Paper Series No 666
August 2006
   Note that the depreciation rates correspond to quarterly values.Table 1:  Structural parameters 
country βδθα
BE 0.9921 0.0075 2.7814 0.6432
DE 0.9999 0.0170 3.1536 0.6095
ES 0.9999 0.0273 3.0063 0.6301
FI 0.9646 0.0815 2.0212 0.6168
FR 0.9832 0.0174 2.7310 0.6320
IE 0.9953 0.0152 2.8683 0.5895
IT 0.9986 0.0115 3.2141 0.6506
NL 0.9925 0.0218 2.6869 0.6082
AT 0.9803 0.0074 2.5686 0.6163
UK 0.9895 0.0115 2.7983 0.6410
SE 0.9957 0.0143 3.1159 0.6135
NO 0.9999 0.0420 3.0661 0.5370
US 0.9999 0.0306 3.1714 0.6383
CA 0.9957 0.0210 2.9700 0.6105
JP 0.9904 0.0082 3.5475 0.6782  
Note: The table reports the estimates of the structural 
parameters for the intertemporal time preference (β), the 
depreciation rate of capital (δ); the substitution elasticity 
between consumption and leisure (θ) and the substitution 
elasticity between capital and labour (α). 
Source: Own calculations, OECD (2004) 
Given these structural parameters, we can now proceed with the estimation of the disequilibrium model by 
relaxing the assumption that labour markets always clear. If they do not, then our above transaction rule 
holds and to the extent to which labour demand rather than labour supply determines the final outcome will 
have some consequences for the dynamics of the whole macroeconomic system. 
2.3  Estimations of labour market disequilibrium 
Having determined the structural parameters relating to preferences, capital depreciation and the labour 
share, the model must now be estimated to establish the extent to which labour market disequilibrium is 
influenced by labour supply relative to labour demand. Note that our estimation strategy implies that the 
short side is not effective but rather our compromise rule. This means that one is neither on the demand nor 
on the supply curve of labour. By positing that the compromise rule holds we postulate that labour market 
institutions (such as employment protection, wage bargaining coordination and union density as discussed 
below) determine the degree of real rigidities in the labour market. This is measured by the ω in equation 
(A1.3). This means the higher the ω the more the labour demand (from the side of firms) will be the 
dominant side and vice versa.  
14
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taken regarding the interpretation of results, which will be undertaken in detail in the following paragraph. 
Once the first three parameters have been specified, the model can be calibrated using the realised 
technology shocks (instead of the simulated ones), which corresponds to the standard RBC presentation. In 
our case, however, the calibration serves a different purpose, namely to recover the notational labour 
used to determine the ω-parameter simply by minimizing the residual square sum of the difference between 
actually observed employment and model-generated employment. In formal terms: 





t t n n n
2
1 min arg ω ω ω  
were n comes from the frictionless model and n
d, n
s result from the model where the households’ and 
firms’ decisions  have been taken under constraints. 
The results of this estimation procedure and the resulting ω-parameters are reported in Table 2 including 
both euro area and non-euro area OECD countries. For further reference, the table also reports values of 
the institutional indicator we have used (such as the tightness of employment protection legislation, the 
coordination of wage bargaining systems, union density and the tightness of product market regulation). 
All indicators have been taken from various OECD sources. 
As can be seen from the table, the estimates for the ω-parameter of all euro area countries are at the lower 
end of the OECD sample with an (unweighted) average value of 18.7% (and a standard deviation of 8.4% ) 
(Sweden, Norway, UK, US, Canada, Japan). Taking Ireland out of the euro area sample as a country 
coming close to the values of the UK and the US, the average estimates for the euro area would even be 
lower (16.9% and 7.0% respectively). Thus, as our estimates show countries with higher labour market 
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Let us describe here first the estimation procedure of the ω-parameter. 
demand and labour supply decisions of firms and households at each point in time. This, in turn, can be 















BE 0.24 2.1 4.0 52.9 1.9
DE 0.26 2.8 4.0 29.0 1.4
ES 0.20 3.2 3.8 21.6 1.6
FR 0.10 3.1 2.0 9.0 2.1
IE 0.32 1.0 3.3 49.7 0.8
IT 0.13 3.3 2.8 24.1 2.3
NL 0.07 2.4 3.9 26.4 1.4
AT 0.22 2.4 4.4 42.0 1.4
FI 0.13 2.1 4.8 79.1 1.7
SE 0.21 2.4 3.4 91.0 1.4
UK 0.34 0.5 1.8 34.0 0.5
NO 0.19 2.9 4.3 58.0 2.2
US 0.40 0.2 1.0 14.9 1.0
CA 0.21 0.6 1.3 31.4 1.5
JP 0.14 2.6 4.0 24.0 1.5  
Note: The table reports the estimates of the ω-parameter following the estimation procedure 
described in the text. In addition the table reports the OECD-indicators for the strictness of 
employment protection legislation, the level of wage bargaining coordination, the unionisation rates 
and the tightness of product market regulation. 
The indicators for employment protection legislation and product market competition take values 
between 0 and 6, where 0 refers to least regulation and 6 to highest regulation. The indicator for wage 
bargainig coordination represents the average coordination level between 1975 and 2000 ranging 
from 1 for firm-level bargaining, 2 for fragmented industry and company-level bargaining, with little 
or no pattern-setting and 3 for industry-level bargaining with  irregular pattern-setting and moderate 
co-ordination among major bargaining actors, 4 for (informal) co-ordinated bargaining by peak 
confederations, including government-sponsored negotiations  (tripartite agreements, social pacts),  
or government imposition and 5 for (informal) co-ordination of industry-level bargaining by peak 
confederations.  
Source: Own calculations, OECD (1998) 
The next question then will be of how these estimations of the labour market adjustment process are 
affected by structural reforms. In the next section we, therefore, turn to the question of relating existing 
indicators of structural rigidities to the estimates of the labour market disequilibrium process.  
2.4  Interpreting Omega: Real or nominal rigidities? 
The estimation of the model so far has provided for a first picture on the varieties of labour markets both 
within the euro area and among OECD countries. Our main parameter by which structural variety is 
captured is ω. However, when trying to predict the change of our estimated parameters resulting from 
particular reforms, the theoretical model may give only very scarce information. This is also true for the 
measure of the disequilibrium on the labour market, ω. While in the theoretical model, this statistic is 
identified by the extent to which employment is determined by labour demand, at first no clear prediction 
may be given as to which structural reform would affect this parameter and in which direction. 
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In order to assess more accurately the influence of structural reforms on the ω-parameter, we analyse in 
this subsection in more detail exactly what type of reform would influence the labour market 
disequilibrium process. In particular, four hypotheses are analysed in more detail: 
•  Bargaining coordination and nominal wage rigidity: The labour market disequilibrium process may 
be determined by nominal wage rigidities. While no immediate good measure of the determinants 
of nominal wage rigidity may be available
12, a first proxy may be the level of coordination of wage 
bargaining systems: the higher the level of wage bargaining coordination, the more rigid nominal 
wages are across the economy as relative wage adjustments between jobs and occupations will be 
less determined by market forces.  A negative correlation with ω would be expected. 
•  Employment protection and labour adjustment: Labour supply may determine employment the 
higher quantitative labour adjustment costs are, such as strict employment protection legislation, as 
labour demand has increasing difficulties to adjust. A negative correlation with ω would be 
expected. 
•  Bargaining power: Employment is determined by labour demand the stronger bargaining power of 
firms in the wage setting process is. Conversely, the estimate of ω would be inversely correlated 
with the unionisation rate and union density of an economy; 
•  Speed of entry and exits of firms: Finally, labour adjustment costs may also arise from market 
entry and exit as firm turnover is an important element in the determination of overall labour 
demand. Consequently, the estimate of ω may be negatively correlated with product market 
regulation since product market regulation may provide more job security. 
In order to assess which of these four elements best reflects our measure of the labour market 
disequilibrium process, four indicators have been taken from OECD studies that are widely used and cited 
in the literature. In particular, we have compared the cross-country variation of our ω-estimates with (i) the 
degree of wage bargaining coordination, (ii) the strictness of employment protection legislation, (iii) the 
union density,  and (iv) the degree of product market regulation (see Figure 2). 
Although, the figure 1 suggest some confirmation of our above predicted correlation with the ω OLS 
regression reveal that only employment protection and product market regulation provide significant 
(negative) correlations with our estimated values of the ω-parameter, vindicating the interpretation of ω 
                                                       
12   See the International Wage Flexibility Network for an example of comparable nominal and real wage rigidity measures, see 
also Erceg et al. (2000) and Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2005). 
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13. Wage bargaining coordination is only 
statistically significant at the 10% level, indicating that the ω-parameter may also represent nominal wage 
rigidities but to a lesser extent than real adjustment costs. However, the strong correlation of ω with both 
employment protection legislation and product market regulation does not allow any further differentiation 
between labour and product market (real) rigidities, which must be considered an important limitation that 
should be addressed in a follow-up to this work. 
Figure 2: Estimations of omega vs. institutional indicators 










































































































Note: The figures present plots of estimated omegas for OECD countries against different institutional indicators, such as 
the degree of wage bargaining coordination, the strictness of employment protection legislation, union density and the 
tightness of product market regulation. 
Source: Own calculations, OECD (1998) 
In order to facilitate the following discussion, we want to talk about a “flexible” economy when the ω-
parameter is relatively high, approaching values for the UK, the US or Ireland, while we talk about “rigid” 
economies for values of the ω-parameter in the lower range. This may be, in particular, warranted from the 
point of view of the correlation of ω with employment protection and product market regulation and this  
will help focusing the discussion in the following sections. 
                                                       
13   Both employment protection and product market regulation may be related to quantitative adjustment process on the labour 
market: While employment protection refers to adjustment process related to firm-level employment turnover, product market 
regulation refers to adjustment process related to the turnover of firms in an industry. 
18
ECB
Working Paper Series No 666
August 20063.  Structural reforms and cyclical behaviour 
Making labour and product markets more flexible, structural reforms are likely to affect both short-run and 
long run dynamics and will have consequences for both the volatility of the variables following the impact 
of a shock and the correlation of macroeconomic variables. From the standpoint of macroeconomic 
(monetary) policy these issues are important to understand for at least two reasons: On the one hand, 
improved reaction to shocks allows for a more rapid return of the economy to the steady state. On the other 
hand, structural reforms may cause changes in the covariance of macroeconomic variables that allow for 
enhanced smoothing of income shocks across time, i.e. intertemporal smoothing
14. In particular, less 
connected employment and consumption decisions improve the household’s consumption smoothing, with 
potentially beneficial effects on the aggregate economy.  
In this section, we attempt to evaluate these two effects of structural reforms in the context of our model. 
This will be achieved by replacing the country-specific value of the ω-parameter with different – higher – 
values and generating artificial macroeconomic time series on the basis of this modified ω-parameter: so 
called policy experiments that reflect a reduction of real labour market rigidities following structural 
reforms. Comparing standard deviations and correlation of the (artificial) economy after the structural 
reform has been implemented with the original estimates allow to assess the importance of changes in 
adjustment speed for macroeconomic volatility and cyclical efficiency.  
Before proceeding with these structural reform experiments, however, we will first assess the extent to 
which the model allows to replicate the first and second moments of the actual data through a calibration 
exercise on the country sample that we will use for the policy analysis. 
3.1  Calibration 
Based on the above estimates of the structural parameters, our macroeconomic model can be calibrated to 
determine to what extent it replicates the time series properties of the underlying sample economy. As it is 
unlikely that different economies are characterised by exactly the same type of frictions, the calibration is 
done for several euro area countries to assess differences in the validation of the model depending on the 
underlying economy. 
The quality of the calibration is judged by the degree to which the statistical properties of the calibrated 
series – i.e. its first and second order moments – match those of the actual time series. However, given that 
current dynamic general equilibrium models rarely match entirely the underlying sample economy, the 
following country calibrations should also be judged in comparison with existing approaches in order to 
                                                       
14   Intertemporal smoothing is concerned with hedging of non-diversifiable risk (Allen and Gale, 2000, ch. 6). While in the 
absence of more sophisticated financial contracts than exist in this model, such risk cannot be shared across different time 
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helps to account for certain economic correlations. In particular, the literature identifies a certain number of 
limitations of numerical evidence provided by the standard RBC approach (see Cooley, 1995 for an 
overview) that may be better addressed by a framework departing from the underlying assumption of 
perfect competition on all markets. 
The following Table 3 reports on the standard deviation and correlations of the actual economy and the 
calibrated sample for four main macroeconomic variables: consumption, the capital stock, employment and 
production. The model shows differential degrees of success to replicate the moments of the countries’ 
underlying actual data.  While the calibration for Spain seems to be rather successful in replicating the 
sample moments, those for Italy achieve only relative poor results. Overall, the model does not provide 
exact point estimates of the first and second order moments of the underlying time series but makes up for 
a qualitatively accurate picture, which can be considered an important improvement with respect to earlier 
models and which is sufficient from the point of view of our policy analysis in the next section. 
The sample of calibrations can be used to draw some overall conclusions regarding the volatility and 
variable correlations that the model produces. In particular, the following relationships can be established 
making use of a cross-country comparison of the calibration results: 
•  Regarding the relative volatility of the different items, the following ranking can be set up: 
Employment is roughly as volatile as consumption except for Spain, which underwent a 
convergence process. Consumption is slightly less volatile than production, while capital is the 
least volatile component 
•  As regards the cross-variable correlations, the following picture emerges: Production shows the 
highest correlation with consumption, followed by employment and capital (different ordering for 
France), while employment is more strongly correlated with production than with consumption. 
No clear picture emerges regarding the correlation of capital with either employment or 
production. 
Overall, the qualitative performance of our model gives some comfort regarding the underlying 
transmission mechanisms of economic shocks. While the quantitative mismatch for some countries 
indicates further missing elements that have to be taken up in a follow-up to this note, the current state of 
the calibration allows for some policy experiments regarding the change in structural reforms aiming at 
reducing quantitative restrictions such as employment protection legislation or market entry barriers. 
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Consumption 0.006 Consumption 0.004 Consumption 0.005
Capital 0.003 Capital 0.004 Capital 0.004
Employment 0.007 Employment 0.013 Employment 0.005
Production 0.009 Production 0.013 Production 0.009
Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production
Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000
Capital 0.278 1.000 Capital 0.606 1.000 Capital 0.661 1.000
Employment 0.199 0.051 1.000 Employment 0.376 0.029 1.000 Employment 0.742 -0.013 1.000
Production 0.841 0.168 0.515 1.000 Production 0.756 0.143 0.841 1.000 Production 0.821 0.364 0.769 1.000
Consumption 0.009 Consumption 0.005 Consumption 0.005
Capital 0.003 Capital 0.003 Capital 0.002
Employment 0.007 Employment 0.015 Employment 0.007
Production 0.012 Production 0.016 Production 0.014
Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production
Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000
Capital 0.308 1.000 Capital 0.239 1.000 Capital 0.168 1.000
Employment 0.356 0.421 1.000 Employment 0.403 -0.114 1.000 Employment 0.955 -0.126 1.000
Production 0.946 0.318 0.437 1.000 Production 0.811 -0.049 0.845 1.000 Production 0.981 -0.024 0.995 1.000
Consumption 0.011 Consumption 0.002 Consumption 0.002
Capital 0.006 Capital 0.002 Capital 0.002
Employment 0.024 Employment 0.003 Employment 0.003
Production 0.016 Production 0.005 Production 0.005
Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production
Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000
Capital 0.620 1.000 Capital 0.628 1.000 Capital 0.560 1.000
Employment 0.719 0.094 1.000 Employment 0.733 0.021 1.000 Employment 0.759 -0.107 1.000
Production 0.822 0.088 0.919 1.000 Production 0.817 0.079 0.961 1.000 Production 0.857 0.060 0.986 1.000
Consumption 0.008 Consumption 0.002 Consumption
Capital 0.011 Capital 0.003 Capital
Employment 0.006 Employment 0.013 Employment
Production 0.011 Production 0.015 Production
Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production
Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000
Capital 0.338 1.000 Capital 0.900 1.000 Capital 1.000
Employment 0.576 0.167 1.000 Employment 0.638 0.385 1.000 Employment 1.000













Actual data Calibrated data
Standard deviations Standard deviations
Correlations Correlations
Actual data Calibrated data
ITALY
Competitive model
Actual data Calibrated data
Standard deviations Standard deviations
Correlations Correlations
Actual data Calibrated data
GERMANY
Competitive model
Standard deviations Standard deviations Standard deviations
Correlations Correlations Correlations
 
Note: The table shows the comparison of the first and second-order moments of the actual time series with those 
of the calibration resulting from 5000 simulations. The table reports standard deviations and correlations of the 
calibrated data irrespective of the statistical significance. 
Source: Own calculations   
3.2  Labour market reforms in euro area countries 
Having assessed the fit of the disequilibrium model and its improvement over the competitive RBC model, 
we will now turn to the labour market policy experiments and discuss their impact on the short-term 
macroeconomic behaviour. It should be noted that for all policy experiments that are discussed in the 
following, the focus lies on the volatility of the main series and the correlations of these series with 
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indicative only. 
3.2.1  Changes in volatility 
Reducing labour market rigidities by increasing the ω-parameter value does not yield unambiguous results 
in our country sample regarding the volatility of the four macroeconomic series under consideration. As a 
first approximation, it increases the volatility of employment, although this is not vindicated by the 
reaction of the German employment series, which may, however, be an outlier in any case due to the short 
length of its series (only the period after reunification has been used for the calibration of the model). 
Nevertheless, the rise in employment volatility in Spain, France and Italy does not yield the same results as 
consumption and production volatility decreases in Spain but increases in France and Italy.  
Moreover, quantitatively the reaction of the French and Italian series diverge considerably with increasing 
the ω-parameter despite the fact that the original (structural) situation on the labour market as measured by 
the value of the ω-parameter is quite similar in the two countries (ω
Italy=0.13 compared to ω
France=0.10). 
Qualitatively, however, the volatility reaction of employment and production is in both countries more 
important than that of the consumption series. This is also true – albeit in an opposite direction – for Spain 
while Germany experiences reductions in volatility for all four macroeconomic series. 
Actual omega






Consumption 1.65 1.60 1.60 1.57
Capital 2.41 2.36 2.37 2.34
Employment 10.13 9.74 9.73 9.71
Production 15.64 14.86 14.86 14.39
Consumption 6.00 5.40 5.30 5.20
Capital 3.00 3.20 3.20 3.10
Employment 5.00 5.20 5.40 5.70
Production 12.70 12.30 12.00 11.60
Consumption 4.39 5.50 8.60 10.10
Capital 4.17 6.50 12.10 14.70
Employment 13.44 24.10 46.40 56.00
Production 12.70 17.90 31.10 37.20
Consumption 4.62 4.74 5.08 5.32
Capital 2.56 3.39 5.00 5.84
Employment 15.14 23.85 38.41 45.67


















Note: The table shows the calibration results of 5000 simulations when 
implementing different values for the ω-parameter compared to the benchmark case 




US. The table reports all standard deviations and 
correlations irrespective of the statistical significance. 
Source: Own calculations 
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At least as important as the volatility reaction is the reaction of the correlations of macroeconomic 
variables with respect to the changes in labour market rigidities. Phase differences of macroeconomic 
variables allow households to hedge risk by diversifying their supply decisions (savings and labour supply) 
across different activities in the economy. The correlations of these variables hence measure to what extent 
such a risk diversification is possible and are a potential indicator of the welfare loss of labour market 
rigidities due to the cyclical impact these rigidities have (households are risk averse in our set-up). 
In this regard, a noticeable drop in the consumption-employment correlation occurs for our country sample 
– with the exception of Germany, which may be due to the nature and length of the data, but where the 
production-employment correlation drops significantly by 12%. This indicates that households are better 
able to hedge against employment risk when the rigidities on the labour market are reduced, although they 
have to face higher employment volatility. 
Although households seem to be better able to cope with employment risk when labour market rigidities 
are lower, this may not necessarily be the case for income risk, which is related to the correlation between 
consumption and production. Both for Germany and Spain, this correlation barely changes with the policy 
experiments despite the fact that – at least for Spain – both the consumption-employment correlation and 
the employment-production correlation drop considerably. On the other hand, both in France and Italy, 
households manage to better cope with the employment and income risk when labour market rigidities are 
decreasing, as indicated by their reduction in correlation of consumption with both series. 
Part of the reason for the apparent lack of the intertemporal smoothing mechanism with respect to income 
in Germany and Spain may be related to incomplete modelling of nominal rigidities. In particular, the 
absence of any significant reaction of employment volatility in Germany following a relaxation of 
quantitative adjustment costs is an indication for additional constraints – both nominally and real – on 
employment to adjust (such as – for instance – nominal wage floors due to collective wage bargaining). In 
the current state of the model, however, it is difficult to evaluate whether the introduction of such nominal 
rigidities and their reduction implemented in policy experiments would allow to reproduce results similar 
to those obtained for Spain and Germany. 
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Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production
Consumption 1.000 1.000
Capital 0.756 1.000 0.300 1.000
Employment 0.596 0.019 1.000 0.828 0.061 1.000
Production 0.600 -0.048 0.947 1.000 0.965 0.074 0.909 1.000
Consumption 1.000 1.000
Capital 0.753 1.000 0.274 1.000
Employment 0.602 0.103 1.000 0.703 0.153 1.000
Production 0.607 -0.038 0.890 1.000 0.964 0.075 0.808 1.000
Consumption 1.000 1.000
Capital 0.755 1.000 0.255 1.000
Employment 0.599 0.099 1.000 0.594 0.212 1.000
Production 0.604 -0.039 0.890 1.000 0.962 0.075 0.725 1.000
Consumption 1.000 1.000
Capital 0.753 1.000 0.224 1.000
Employment 0.592 0.163 1.000 0.450 0.271 1.000
Production 0.609 -0.031 0.834 1.000 0.957 0.071 0.620 1.000
Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production
Consumption 1.000 1.000
Capital 0.606 1.000 0.239 1.000
Employment 0.376 0.029 1.000 0.403 -0.114 1.000
Production 0.756 0.143 0.841 1.000 0.811 -0.049 0.845 1.000
Consumption 1.000 1.000
Capital 0.757 1.000 0.318 1.000
Employment 0.308 0.051 1.000 0.252 -0.129 1.000
Production 0.598 0.172 0.914 1.000 0.637 -0.071 0.891 1.000
Consumption 1.000 1.000
Capital 0.894 1.000 0.451 1.000
Employment 0.293 0.061 1.000 0.161 -0.140 1.000
Production 0.481 0.193 0.966 1.000 0.443 -0.089 0.945 1.000
Consumption 1.000 1.000
Capital 0.917 1.000 0.514 1.000
Employment 0.292 0.063 1.000 0.133 -0.141 1.000




















Note: The table shows the calibration results of 5000 simulations when implementing different values for the ω-parameter 




US. The table reports all standard deviations and correlations irrespective of the statistical 
significance. 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Overall, the policy experiments for the four euro area countries do not allow to draw a uniform picture. 
This can be partly related to the fact that the nature of the imperfections remains relatively limited, not 
accounting for other rigidities – for instance on the product market, but in particular nominal rigidities – 
that may be of equal importance in some of these countries. Nevertheless, two results – partly confirmed 
by an analysis of Japan, see the following box – stand out that are of particular relevance for 
macroeconomic policies: 
•  On the one hand, relaxing adjustment costs increases the reaction with respect to shocks, leading to 
higher volatility of the underlying variables in case of a very rigid economy (in the understanding 
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allows for flattening of quantitative reactions. 
•  On the other hand, the reduced correlation between employment and consumption allows for a 
smoother adjustment path of the economy. For those economies that already are relatively more 
flexible (again as measured by our model), this allows an overall decrease in the volatility of the 
time series as witnessed by the examples of Germany and Spain. The issue of intertemporal 
smoothing will be further discussed in the following section. 
Box: Labour market rigidities and cyclical behaviour – the case of Japan 
In order to assess the generality of the methodology developed in the preceding sections, it may be 
interesting to extend its application to countries outside the euro area. In this respect, the Japanese 
economy seems to constitute a particular useful example, given its relatively rigid labour market structures, 
at least when judged from the indicators presented in Table 2.  
In table A we presented the match of the calibration of the model to the variances and covariances of the 
actual data. As can be seen from the table, the standard deviations of the calibrated series match fairly well 
those of the actual data. However, the calibrated correlations across the main macroeconomic time series 
provide at best a qualitative assessment regarding the relationships between these variables. However, in 
particular in comparison with the benchmark perfect competition RBC model (bottom panel) the modified 
model taking into account the labour market imperfections perform noticeably better. 
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Consumption 0.011 Consumption 0.011
Capital 0.007 Capital 0.007
Employment 0.007 Employment 0.007
Production 0.016 Production 0.016
Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production
Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000
Capital -0.108 1.000 Capital 0.411 1.000
Employment 0.419 -0.318 1.000 Employment 0.307 -0.017 1.000





Consumption Capital Employment Production
Consumption 1.000
Capital 0.404 1.000
Employment 0.851 -0.129 1.000
Production 0.952 0.113 0.970 1.000
Correlations
Correlations Correlations
Calibrated data of standard RBC model
Standard deviations
Actual data Calibrated data
Standard deviations Standard deviations
 
Note: The standard deviations and correlations for the calibrated data have been calculated on the basis of the actually observed 
technology shock, not on the simulated one. 
Source: Own calculations 
Similar to the analysis for the euro area countries, a policy experiment can be conducted for Japan in order 
to assess how the macroeconomic volatility evolves under the influence of relaxing real labour market 
rigidities. The results of the exercise are presented in table B. As can be seen from the table, a significant 
increase in macroeconomic volatility across all series can be observed, similarly to the results that we had 
found earlier for France and Italy. At the same time, however, employment shows a significant 
disconnection from consumption, a phenomenon that we had taken earlier as an indication of increased 
intertemporal smoothing (see also the discussion in the next section). While this seems to validate our 
earlier conjecture regarding the importance of labour market deregulation for such risk sharing to be 
reinforced, it does not – at the same time – lead to a decrease of volatility as we had observed it for 
Germany and Spain. 
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Consumption 0.0125 Consumption 0.0140
Capital 0.0094 Capital 0.0145
Employment 0.0436 Employment 0.0704
Production 0.0383 Production 0.0537
Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production
Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000
Capital 0.3982 1.000 Capital 0.5406 1.000
Employment 0.3044 -0.0293 1.000 Employment 0.2522 -0.0211 1.000
Production 0.6889 0.0499 0.8855 1.000 Production 0.5387 0.0606 0.9402 1.000
Consumption 0.0171 Consumption 0.0192
Capital 0.0229 Capital 0.0283
Employment 0.1108 Employment 0.1348
Production 0.0795 Production 0.0956
Consumption Capital Employment Production Consumption Capital Employment Production
Consumption 1.000 Consumption 1.000
Capital 0.6897 1.000 Capital 0.7498 1.000
Employment 0.2354 -0.0168 1.000 Employment 0.2335 -0.0147 1.000
Production 0.4344 0.0679 0.9706 1.000 Production 0.4036 0.0720 0.9783 1.000
Actual omega Improvement by 1 std. deviation
Standard deviations Standard deviations
Correlations Correlations
Improvement to UK levels Improvement to US levels
Standard deviations Standard deviations
Correlations Correlations
 
Note: The standard deviations and correlations have been calculated on the basis of 5000 simulations of technology shock time 
series. 
Source: Own calculations 
3.3  Intertemporal smoothing 
In order to further test the importance of intertemporal smoothing, the following Table 5 provides an 
overview of relative volatility of real private consumption with both production and employment series. If 
the above conjecture is correct, i.e. that a decrease of the consumption-employment correlation entails an 
increasing intertemporal smoothing, the raise in savings should be reflected as a decrease of the relative 
volatility of consumption with respect to either production or employment or both as it would help to 
smoothened consumption relative to these two series. 
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Actual +1 std. dev. UK-level US-level
DE 10.6% 10.8% 10.8% 10.9%
ES 47.2% 43.9% 44.2% 44.8%
FR 34.6% 30.7% 27.7% 27.2%
IT 28.9% 23.8% 18.2% 16.5%
JP 32.7% 26.1% 21.5% 20.1%
DE 16.3% 16.4% 16.5% 16.2%
ES 120.0% 103.8% 98.1% 91.2%
FR 32.7% 22.8% 18.5% 18.0%
IT 30.5% 19.9% 13.2% 11.6%


























Note: The table presents the relative volatility of consumption both with respect to 
production and employment as a measure of intertemporal smoothing. 
Source: Own calculations 
In this regard, the following numbers are roughly confirming our initial conjecture in the preceding section. 
Interestingly to note is that both for France and for Italy, a substantial smoothening of consumption can be 
observed that has not been reflected in the above correlations. On the other hand, consumption has not 
increased in relative smoothness in Germany (the differences across the policy experiments are not 
statistically significant) despite the above observed reduced correlation between consumption and 
employment. 
In order for households to be able to insure against certain types of  employment and income risks, savings, 
employment and finance decisions must be at their free disposal; the existence of rigidities and adjustment 
costs through different institutional settings limits the household’s ability for such risk arbitrage, even 
though it may reduce first-order employment risk. An important issue in this context is the problem to what 
extent households have sufficiently access to financial markets to smooth out consumption, if -- through 
reforms -- the labour market is made more flexible.  To our knowledge, however, this aspect of structural 
reforms has not sufficiently been addressed in the literature. 
Overall we can observe an increase in intertemporal consumption smoothing is accompanied by a rising ω. 
Yet, in order to achieve this increased intertemporal smoothing households have to improve on 
intertemporally arbitraging risk arising from macroeconomic (systemic) risks. What is interesting in this 
respect in our model here, is that the policy experiments have been conducted on basis of labour market 
adjustment processes only, unrelated to financial markets (which, anyway, are complete in the model here.) 
Reduced employment adjustment costs may increasingly privatise production risks in the hands of 
households. On the other hand, the improved risk insurance that a change in employment adjustment costs 
implies, results unambiguously in an improvement in the relative dynamics of the different macroeconomic 
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reduced overall volatility of the consumption path. Less positively formulated, a privatisation of 
employment risks occurs where households are forced to insure individually against employment risks. In 
the model here, this is nevertheless beneficial as it decreases both overall production and consumption risk; 
with a CRRA utility function, this will decrease the risk premium the household is requiring to smooth 
allow the household to better use the both savings and labour supply decisions to arbitrage production 
risks, which is made possible by the presence of complete capital markets in our model. 
4.  Conclusion 
The paper has attempted to assess the role of labour market institutions, giving rise to labour market 
frictions and non-clearing markets on the dynamic properties of OECD countries. In particular, we employ 
a dynamic general (dis-)equilibrium model allowing for both households’ decisions of labour supply and 
consumption paths. Moreover, a model of sticky wages
15  and an adaptive decision process of the 
households is assumed when solving the model. The household has to take into account constraints on the 
labour market when the decision over consumption goods is made and firms are possibly constrained on 
the product market. We have then estimated the labour market disequilibrium parameter ω for a selected 
calibration results reflecting the dynamic properties of some OECD economies. We have shown that those 
ω-parameters are negatively correlated with the labour market institution variables. We have argued that 
these institutional variables are particularly important in the case of some European OECD countries and 
that besides having lasting long-term effects on macroeconomic performance, they may also impact on the 
short-run macro-dynamics. Finally, we have attempted to explore the effects of structural reforms on the 
labor market for a selection of countries by way of simulations in order to assess their likely impact on the 
volatility and correlation of the main macroeconomic time series that are calibrated. 
On the basis of these simulation results the paper allows to draw some conclusions: 
•  Our macroeconomic non-clearing labour market model allows better than the standard RBC model 
to reflect the existence of labour market institutions and the institutional variation of labour 
markets across OECD countries. 
•  Moreover, introducing nominal and real frictions and non-clearing market appear to describe the 
labour market dynamics better than the standard RBC model. In particular, the behaviour of the  
                                                       
15 A Calvo type wage adjustment with strong wage persistence is discussed in Gong and Semmler (2005). 
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consumption over the cycle and thereby improve its welfare. The lower employment adjustment costs 
group of countries. The paper has presented the steps that led to the estimation of structural parameters and macro variables significantly become more realistic as compared to standard intertemporal model 
with frictionless choice of labour effort and consumption.  
•  Finally, we could study the effects of implementing structural reforms by allowing the nominal and 
real frictions to be reduced which, on the one hand, increases the production and employment risks 
in the hands of households. On the other hand, it improves the efficiency characteristics of OECD 
economies by resulting in a greater intertemporal consumption smoothing.
16  
Overall, the paper presents first evidence on the impact of nominal and real stickiness as well as the 
structural reforms on the dynamic properties of OECD economies. The model shows some potential to 
evaluate structural reforms. At the current juncture, the model presented in this paper may still not be 
detailed enough to allow for a richer picture of nominal and real stickiness in OECD countries. Its 
conclusions have, therefore, to be taken with some caution; nevertheless, the paper shows the promising 
nature of such an approach for further developments including a more detailed description of the price 
 
                                                       
16 Which, in order to properly work, requires perfect capital markets. 
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5.1  Time period covered 
The following table summarises the time periods covered for the different OECD countries that have been 
estimated in this report. 
Table 6: Country time periods 















JP Japan 1970Q1-2003Q4  
Source: OECD, 2004 
5.2  Treatment of missing observations 
Some of the data have only been available at the annual frequency. In order to obtain quarterly data, the 
series have been interpolated with quarterly indices of related series. This has been a particular problem for 
capital stock data that often only exist at an annual frequency. Here, we interpolated using quarterly Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation data. Similarly some of the capacity utilisation series had to be proxied. The 
method has made use of the Chow-Lin (1971) approach using GLS estimators to account for serial 
correlation in the data. 
5.3  Country notes 
The following tables summarise the country coverage for the individual series and provide – where 
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GDP 1960Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Private Consumption 1960Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 1960Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Government Consumption 1960Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Exports 1968Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Imports 1968Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
GDP Deflator 1960Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Wage rate 1960Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Capacity utilisation 1960Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Capital stock 1960Q4-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Hours Worked 1960Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Employment 1960Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1
Labour Force 1960Q1-2004Q1 Break in series in 1991Q1  
Note: The break in the series due to the reunification has been 
accounted for by estimating and calibrating the model for both 














Monthly hours; break in 
series 2000Q1
Employment 1977Q1-2003Q4
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expecting bottlenecks"; 
actual capacity utilisation 
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Note: All series for capacity utilisation refer to the 
manufacturing sector only. 
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